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"Obama to Nominate Kagan
to Seat on Supreme Court"
The Wall Street Journal
May 11, 2010
Jess Bravin & Laura Meckler
President Barack Obama is expected to
nominate Solicitor General Elena Kagan to
the Supreme Court, choosing a woman who
has worked in elite legal and policy jobs but
has never served as a judge, people familiar
with the matter said Sunday.
The selection is to be announced Monday. If
confirmed by the Senate, she would succeed
retiring Justice John Paul Stevens, the 90-
year-old leader of the court's liberal wing.
In making his choice, aides said the
president looked for someone with not only
a top legal mind but also the ability to bring
people of differing views together. With the
Supreme Court closely divided
ideologically, the president is hoping his
pick will be a leader who can build
majorities in close cases.
He saw that quality in Ms. Kagan, who
earned a reputation for bridging divides as a
policy adviser in the Clinton White House
and, in particular, over six years as dean of
Harvard Law School. At Harvard, she
aggressively recruited new faculty of all
ideological stripes and went out of her way
to make sure conservatives felt comfortable
on the left-leaning campus. She won
accolades from colleagues and students
across the political spectrum.
Conservatives with whom she has worked
are likely to endorse her nomination,
providing helpful support as the Senate
considers the matter. The White House has
already lined up people willing to speak out
on her behalf, including conservatives,
women's groups and public interest law
advocates.
Liberals are likely to support her, but both
liberals and conservatives who are active on
judicial policy say they have concerns
because Ms. Kagan lacks a public record on
issues that are important to them. Discerning
her views may be more difficult than it
would be for a judge who has handled many
cases.
Opponents of her nomination are certain to
raise questions about her decision, as
Harvard law dean, to sign a friend-of-the-
court brief arguing that law schools did not
have to allow the U.S. military to recruit on
campus because the don't-ask, don't-tell
policy barred gays from serving openly.
She and other law deans argued the rule
violated their antidiscrimination policies,
and Ms. Kagan called the policy
"profoundly wrong." But they were
overruled by a unanimous Supreme Court.
The official announcement on Monday will
kick off a months-long effort to sell the
nomination to the public and to the Senate,
where Democrats hope for a final vote
before the August recess.
Advocates on both sides of the political
spectrum predicted that, absent new
information coming to light, Ms. Kagan
would probably be confirmed with at least a
handful of Republican votes. Last year, the
Senate confirmed her as solicitor general on
a 61-31 vote, with seven Republicans voting
yes.
Mr. Obama has known Ms. Kagan since
they were law professors together at the
University of Chicago in the early 1990s. At
age 50, she would be the youngest justice on
the court, and she could provide Mr. Obama
a legacy for decades to come. She was the
youngest of the four candidates Mr. Obama
interviewed.
The other three all serve on the federal
appellate bench, the farm team for Supreme
Court nominees in recent decades. They
were Merrick Garland of Washington, D.C.;
Diane Wood of Chicago; and Sidney
Thomas of Billings, Montana.
Judge Thomas was the least well known of
the three, the only one not to be also
considered for Mr. Obama's first Supreme
Court appointment.
Judge Wood was seen as having the most
liberal record of the four, and she was the
candidate many liberal groups were rooting
for. Judge Garland, who as a Justice
Department official in the 1990s oversaw
the prosecutions of Oklahoma City bomber
Timothy McVeigh and Unabomber
Theodore Kaczynski, was considered the
easiest to confirm because many
Republicans are on the record praising him.
After graduating from Harvard Law School
in 1986, Ms. Kagan clerked for federal
appeals Judge Abner Mikva, who was a
mentor to generations of Democrats,
including Mr. Obama, and then clerked for
Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall.
She spent two years at the prestigious
Washington law firm Williams & Connolly,
the only time she practiced law in the private
sector.
In 1993, then-Sen. Joseph Biden (D., Del.),
chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, hired Ms. Kagan as a special
counsel during confirmation proceedings for
President Bill Clinton's first Supreme Court
nominee, Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
She was a domestic policy adviser in the
Clinton administration, helping implement a
sweeping overhaul of welfare law and
working with Congress on legislation
allowing the government to regulate
tobacco, a measure that did not become law
until long after she left.
In 1999, Mr. Clinton nominated her to serve
as a federal appellate judge, but she never
received a hearing in the Republican Senate.
She returned to Harvard that year and was
made dean in 2003.
In earlier eras, Supreme Court justices came
from a variety of backgrounds, but Ms.
Kagan would be the first nonjudge since
Nixon appointees Lewis Powell and William
Rehnquist in 1972.
Some welcome that diversity, such as Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick
Leahy (D., Vt.), who has repeatedly called
for a nominee outside the "judicial
monastery." But others, including the top
Republican on the Judiciary Committee,
Alabama Sen. Jeff Sessions, have
questioned whether someone who has never
been a judge has the experience or track
record to serve on the nation's highest court.
Ms. Kagan would be the third woman on the
nine-member court, a record, and just the
fourth in U.S. history.
But Mr. Obama bypassed the opportunity to
diversify the court in other respects. Like the
eight justices she would join, Ms. Kagan
was educated at Ivy League universities,
earning her undergraduate degree at
Princeton and attending law school at
Harvard. The court is dominated by people
from the East Coast; she, too, was born in
New York City and has spent most of her
career in Washington and Boston.
She is Jewish, meaning the court would, for
the first time, have no Protestants. With her,
membership would include three Jews and
six Catholics.
Some conservatives expressed concerns
about the paucity of information on Ms.
Kagan's views.
"It's a return to a stealth nomination because
she has no judicial record," said Manuel
Miranda, chairman of Third Branch
Conference, a politically conservative
coalition, and a former Republican Senate
staffer on judicial matters.
"I like her," he added. "I think she would be
possibly the best nomination that
conservatives might want. But the bottom
line is, from a nonpartisan nonideological
point of view, she is not very well qualified
for the court."
Not all liberals were cheering a Kagan pick.
They cited, among other things, scattered
hints that Ms. Kagan might hold hawkish-
leaning views about terrorism detentions.
Ms. Kagan's scholarly work has focused on
two legal topics: free expression and
administrative law. While both are
significant parts of the Supreme Court
docket, that leaves few public statements on
a host of issues likely to confront the justices
in the years ahead, including the rights of
criminal defendants and suspected terrorists,
the extent of federal authority over the
national economy and social questions such
as abortion and gay rights.
But while neither the public nor the Senate
Judiciary Committee may know Ms.
Kagan's approach to such questions, the
Obama administration has had a year to
evaluate her legal thinking. As solicitor
general, she is the administration's chief
legal advocate before the Supreme Court, a
position that gives her a role in virtually
every important legal issue that could
involve the federal government.
In effect, Ms. Kagan has had an opportunity
to privately audition her jurisprudence
before the president and his advisers, on
both substantive issues and in litigation
strategies to secure the five votes needed to
prevail at the Supreme Court.
Moreover, Ms. Kagan's experience in the
executive branch could be reassuring to an
administration that could face a more hostile
Congress after midterm elections in
November.
As a White House aide in the Clinton
administration's second term, she worked to
advance Democratic domestic policy
initiatives opposed by a Republican
Congress. After leaving government, she
leveraged that into her signature academic
work, a June 2001 Harvard Law Review
article describing ways for an activist
president to achieve his goals by asserting
inherent constitutional powers and through
vigorous use of regulatory authority
delegated by law.
"The Sphinx: Why the Inscrutable Elena Kagan
Makes Everyone Nervous"
Slate
May 10, 2010
Dahlia Lithwick
Now that Elena Kagan is officially the
White House's Supreme Court nominee,
pundits have launched themselves into their
CSI-worthy project of sorting through tiny
filaments of evidence for her true
ideological views. With no judicial record to
pore over, and some of the wonkiest law-
review articles ever penned to her credit,
Kagan has mastered the fine art of nearly
perfect ideological inscrutability. Even
Jeffrey Toobin, her law school study partner,
has virtually no idea what she really
believes. That only makes us more
determined to sift through the dry-cleaning
slips and the Post-it notes to try to guess at
who the real Elena Kagan might be. And
since she has been hard to know, we
struggle to find someone else we might
compare her to. Paul Campos, a law
professor at the University of Colorado, has
(fairly ridiculously) compared Kagan to
Harriet Miers. Andrew Cohen has compared
her to Chief Justice John Roberts.
So we've begun another round in the
judicial confirmation game of "my trace
DNA evidence is better than yours." A letter
Kagan co-authored in 2005 condemning a
court-stripping proposal for suspected
terrorists at Guantanamo Bay will hearten
the left. Her statement at her 2009
confirmation hearing that the president
could detain enemy combatants without trial
will make liberals very nervous. Kagan's
refusal to find a right to same sex-marriage
in the Constitution may provide some small
comfort to conservatives. But the fact that
she was strongly and vocally opposed to
military recruitment at Harvard Law School
until the courts forced her to rescind her
policy suggests a willingness to fight for
liberal causes. We will debate the
ambiguous evidence of Kagan's views on
executive power for weeks without knowing
much of anything....
It's not quite that Kagan offers something
for everybody. It's more that she offers
nothing, so there is something for everybody
to wail about.
What nobody disputes about Kagan is that
she is terrifically intelligent, an able
manager, ambitious, and well-liked and that
she was all that and a wheel of brie when it
came to sorting out the problems she
inherited as dean of Harvard Law School.
She ran the most successful fundraising
campaign in law-school history and attracted
important right-wing thinkers to campus.
Nobody (beyond Glenn Beck) has ever
accused Kagan of being a liberal firebrand
or a wild-eyed idealist. And while some of
her supporters suggest that she may prove
far more liberal than anyone expected,
another Kagan fan told Nina Totenberg this
past weekend that "Elena is the single most
competitive and most inscrutable person I
have ever known."
It's perfectly clear that Kagan brings the
same qualities to the court that Obama
prizes in politics generally: She has staked
her professional career on reaching across
the aisle and showing respect for all
viewpoints. It's one of the reasons her
greatest fans include Ted Olson and Charles
Fried. And that's why the interesting
question is how serious the GOP effort to
scuttle her nomination will be. Yes, they are
already muttering about her inexperience
and her rampant Harvard-ness. But
ultimately, how do you wage an epic world
war over a constitutional sphinx?
This morning, Bob Schieffer predicted that
the confirmation fight to get Kagan onto the
high court will be "a really bitter and vicious
one." While she was eminently qualified, he
said, he noted that it's an "especially toxic
election year." On the very same show,
however, CBS legal correspondent Jan
Crawford predicted that the battle would not
be contentious at all: "She's very engaging
very challenging, she's quite dynamic in her
personality," she said, "and you see that
when she's arguing cases before the
Supreme Court. The justices really like her
-you should see Justice Scalia (obviously a
conservative) and Kagan going back and
forth."
I confess that I haven't always seen Kagan
as enormously successful with the court's
conservative wing, although she has always
been conversational and collegial with them.
That's largely because one has to argue
before the court dozens of times to become
truly expert at it, and Kagan's first oral
argument at the high court last fall was also
her first oral argument, period. In her total of
six arguments at the Supreme Court, some
of us have seen less playful banter than all
out friction, most notably between Kagan
and the chief justice. And it's not clear to me
that she's had a profound influence on
Justice Kennedy's views yet, either. It can
be true, from my observation, that the
justices are hardest on the lawyers they like
best and trust most. But it's hard to see
Kagan's performances thus far at oral
argument recommending her for the court.
That said, I'm not certain excellence at oral
argument always predicts judicial
excellence, and it's possible that the
qualities (or lack thereof) Kagan has brought
to her role as solicitor general make her an
even more attractive justice. Just as some
have argued that Kagan's lack of important
academic scholarship makes her better
suited for the court, there is a strong
argument to be made that Kagan's
understated, even mellow, outings as SG
show that she will approach the job of
Supreme Court justice just as Obama would
wish: open-minded, scrupulously fair, and
always willing to concede error (so much so
that she has sometimes been faulted for
giving too much ground on Citizens United).
She is always measured and polite. In fact, if
you listen to her oral argument in the
Citizens United case, you may well be struck
by the fact that it's Roberts who plays the
role of oral advocate while Kagan seems to
be striving for cautious centrism.
Six appearances before the Supreme Court
don't tell us much about an advocate's
ideology. Kagan was representing the
Obama administration and defending federal
statutes. But to the extent she betrayed her
own judicial temperament in these outings,
Kagan's performances reveal a good deal
about the kind of justice she may be: careful,
narrow, and mild.
This brings us back to Obama's
announcement this morning, a statement that
hammered home the two key prongs of the
president's judicial vision: centrism and
hating on the Roberts court. Kagan, noted
Obama, is a proponent of bipartisanship, of
"understanding before she disagrees" and of
seeking "common ground." So far so good.
But then the president tried to make her the
face of opposition to the Citizens United
decision, a decision so staggeringly
unpopular that Obama has been
campaigning against it since January.
Introducing America to Kagan today, the
president tried to turn her loss in that case
into a big win for populism: "During her
time in this office, she has repeatedly
defended the rights of shareholders and
ordinary citizens against unscrupulous
corporations," Obama said, adding, "In the
Citizens United case, she defended
bipartisan campaign finance reform against
special interests seeking to spend unlimited
money to influence our elections."
It's a fine needle the president is trying to
thread: positioning Kagan as a bipartisan
consensus-builder who is also going to
knock some sense into the right-wing
corporate ideologues on the court. Adam
Liptak has already detailed how Kagan
actually abandoned Obama's legal theory of
Citizens United (that "in a democracy,
powerful interests must not be allowed to
drown out the voices of ordinary citizens")
by the time she argued the case. In other
words, Kagan may not hold Obama's view
of the case, and she may not be inclined to
campaign against it at her hearings.
It's not at all clear from her record whether
Kagan will someday prove to be the Jurist
for the Little Guy or the Judge Who Bridged
the Partisan Divide. There is ample evidence
in her professional and academic record that
she has ably managed to do both at different
times, depending on the professional
position she held and whose views she was
representing. We will hear a good many
testimonials in the coming weeks that Kagan
has the heart of a progressive lion and the
political skills of a diplomat. What remains
to be seen is whether she will put the former
to service in the interest of the latter--or
vice versa.
"Kagan's Credentials Take Hits on Hill"
USA Today
May 12, 2010
Joan Biskupic
One of the prevailing criticisms of President
Obama's choice of U.S. Solicitor General
Elena Kagan for the Supreme Court is that
she has never been a judge.
Senate Republicans in particular see it as a
problem for this nominee. Senate
Republican leader Mitch McConnell says
the court "does not lend itself to on-the-job
training." Texas Sen. John Cornyn, a
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
asserts that, "Most Americans believe that
prior judicial experience is a necessary
credential" for a justice.
Yet, those remarks account for only recent
nominations and defy the sentiment of
Democratic senators such as Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick
Leahy that experience outside "the judicial
monastery" is valuable.
Kagan began meeting with Senate leaders,
including Leahy and McConnell, on
Wednesday.
Historically, presidents routinely sought
nominees from beyond the bench. Of the
nine justices on the court that decided the
1954 landmark Brown v. Board of
Education, leading to school integration,
only one had been elevated from a lower
court. Sherman Minton, who earlier had
been a U.S. senator, was appointed in 1949
directly from a federal judgeship. Chief
Justice Earl Warren, who presided 1953-69,
had been governor of California.
William Rehnquist, who was chief justice
before the current Chief Justice John
Roberts, had no judicial experience before
taking his seat in 1972. President Nixon
nominated him in fall 1971. Rehnquist had
been an assistant attorney general for the
Office of Legal Counsel.
Rehnquist, along with Lewis Powell, who
was a Richmond lawyer and former head of
the American Bar Association, were the
most recent appointees named without
having previously worn the black robe.
"In principle, more experience is always
better than less," says Harvard University
law professor Richard Fallon. "It would be
ideal to have someone who had been a trial
lawyer and a trial court judge, an appellate
lawyer and appellate judge, someone who
had experience in the executive branch,
someone who had worked on Capitol Hill,
someone who had served in the military, and
more. But no actual person can have all
possible experiences that might be helpful,
and I don't think that being an appellate
judge is any more necessary than the
others."
Kagan, 50, has been U.S. solicitor general
since March 2009. Before that, she was dean
of Harvard Law School. She served in the
Clinton administration, taught at the
University of Chicago and worked for a
Washington law firm.
At Kagan's Senate Judiciary Committee
hearings for the solicitor general post in
February 2009, she addressed concerns
about her lack of experience, in that case
that she had never argued before the
justices: "When you get up to that podium at
the Supreme Court, the question is much
less how many times you have been there
before than what do you bring up with you.
And I think I bring up some of the right
things."
More than half of the 20th-century
appointees did not come directly from lower
courts. The bench was filled with justices
who had been U.S. senators, such as Hugo
Black; U.S. attorneys general, such as
Robert Jackson; and governors, such as
Francis Murphy of Michigan and Warren.
Thurgood Marshall, who served 1967-91,
was the last justice who had been a U.S.
solicitor general. Marshall, the nation's first
African-American justice, had earlier been
an appeals court judge-unlike Kagan.
Some Republican senators who have
criticized Kagan's lack of judicial
background applauded that trait in Harriet
Miers in 2005. When President Bush
nominated then-White House counsel Miers,
Comyn said, "She would fill some very
important gaps in the Supreme Court,
because right now you have people who
have been federal judges, circuit judges
most of their lives, or academicians." Miers
pulled out amid broad criticism.
"The Times, They Are A-Changin"'
SCOTUSblog
May 10, 2010
Lyle Denniston
Elena Kagan was not quite four years old
when Bob Dylan's studio album, "The
Times, They Are a-Changin'," was released
46 years ago. But that might well be the
theme song for the Supreme Court, when
Solicitor General Kagan, as now seems
likely, takes the seat soon to be vacated by
Justice John Paul Stevens. The third woman
on the bench, and the youngest of three
Justices in their fifties, Kagan could well be
an agent of that change. A glaring fact: she
is nearly three generations younger than the
man she would replace.
As the days wound down this past week
toward Kagan's selection by President
Obama, the nation could look West and East
and see cultural conventions on the verge of
change, much along the lines of Dylan's title
track. At the Salt Palace Convention Center
in Salt Lake City, a Republican U.S. Senator
who is a Mormon and has absolutely solid
conservative credentials was dumped by his
own party. In Boston, some 2,400 miles-
and perhaps a world-away, the gay rights
movement got a serious hearing in the
Moakley U.S. Courthouse on its plea to
change the nation's legal perception of
marriage.
What those events have in common, though,
is that both will figure in the fight over the
future of the Supreme Court that begins later
this morning with the announcement of
Kagan's nomination, and both will
influence, in coming months and years, the
political pressures on the Court.
In Salt Lake City, the still young but already
politically grown-up Tea Party movement
was in the process of changing the face of
American politics, denying nomination to
GOP stalwart Robert Bennett, in a
demonstration much more convincing than
even the surprise January replacement of the
late Sen. Edward Kennedy with Sen. Scott
Brown in Massachusetts, and at least as
convincing as driving Florida Gov. Charlie
Crist out of the GOP to run for the Senate as
a frantically struggling independent.
The Senate-and especially the Senate's
Republicans and some centrist Democrats-
will no doubt read some special significance
into Bennett's political demise. Already, the
Tea Party activists in Utah are boldly saying
that Sen. Orrin Hatch, a longtime leader of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, will be next
to feel their displeasure with Washington.
Whatever the long-term future of the Tea
Party is as a political movement, its early
show of power and the knack to use it will,
in the short term, deepen the partisan rancor
in Washington and perhaps the nation, and
the processing of Kagan's nomination may
well be affected to some degree. She is a
product of the nation's liberal Northeast,
born in Manhattan, and tutored in the
corridors of power. She definitely will not
be a poster figure for the Tea Party.
Moreover, the social conservatism that is so
much a part of the Tea Party agenda is likely
to have a significant limiting effect on
President Obama's legislative initiatives
over the next two-plus years, and that
inevitably will alter the policy agenda that
translates into legal controversy before the
Supreme Court. Already, under pressure
that can be traced directly to recent terrorist
incidents, the Obama Administration is
talking of narrowing the constitutional right
to "Miranda warnings" for terrorism
suspects-posing a major test for the Court.
And Congress's attempt to seize control
over detention policy is forcing the
Administraton's hand about Guantanamo,
risking a potential confrontation with the
Court.
Tea Party resistance to the health care
reform law, and the effect that resistance has
so far had in stirring up legal challenges to
that law, may test the current Supreme
Court's tolerance for expansive government
involvement in the economy. That could
spill over into disputes over Washington
superintendence of the financial industry.
Where Kagan would come out on such
issues could well be tested during Senate
review of her nomination.
Still, there is a counter-current running in
American culture, and Kagan has been a part
of that. This is the spread of tolerance of gay
people, a phenomenon that is particularly
evident in the attitudes of younger
generations. Just a few years ago, it would
have been astonishing for eight same-sex
couples to show up in a federal court,
demanding equality not for their sexual
orientation but, of all things, for their
marriage. They were married in
Massachusetts, and have now sued in federal
court to challenge some of the denial of
equal benefits to spouses that Congress
mandated in the Defense of Marriage Act.
Their case in the federal courthouse in
Boston is running almost simultaneously
with a challenge in federal court in San
Francisco to the constitutionality of
Proposition 8-that state's ban on gay
marriage. Both of the cases illustrate that
issues of gay equality will reach the
Supreme Court, and sooner than had once
been expected. Not far behind them, very
likely, will be new issues over the don't ask-
don't tell policy against gays serving in the
U.S. military-a policy that Kagan, at
Harvard Law School, energetically resisted.
These issues, too, almost certainly will play
some role in the review of Kagan's
nomination. The Court that she would join
has already established itself as significantly
more tolerant of gay equality than much of
political America is or is likely soon to be.
But the marriage equality issue may be a
supreme test of that tolerance.
For the time being, Kagan can anticipate
that, on many of the heavy controversies that
come before the Court, she may not have
much opportunity to exert significant
influence. The more committed of the
Court's conservative Justices have been
having increasing success in drawing swing
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy to join them in
major cases, and that makes a five-Justice
majority that simply may not need Kagan's
vote, even if it were available. Although
known for her skills at persuasion, Kagan is
but a fifty-year-old with no prior experience
in shaping judicial majorities.
Though nominally taking the Stevens seat,
she has very little chance, in her early years,
of developing the capacity that he had so
successfully mastered in drawing Justice
Kennedy, sometimes surprisingly, to the
liberal side.
Still, Kagan, just because she is only 50,
could share the perspective of her emergent
generation with her older colleagues, and
perhaps persuade them, now and then, to see
what the post-Bob Dylan age has become.
"Thesis Is Window on Roots
of Kagan's Legal Creed"
The New York Times
May 19, 2010
Peter Baker & Sheryl Gay Stolberg
As a young graduate student, Elena Kagan
wrote that it was "not necessarily wrong or
invalid" for judges to "try to mold and steer
the law" to achieve social ends, but warned
that such rulings must be rooted in legal
principles to be accepted by society and
endure.
Ms. Kagan, the nation's solicitor general and
President Obama's nominee to the Supreme
Court, gave an expansive view in a 1983
thesis of both the potential and the limits of
the court's ability to make change in society
amid the rise of the conservative backlash
against the liberal rulings of previous
decades.
"U.S. Supreme Court justices live in the
knowledge that they have the authority to
command or to block great social, political
and economic change," she wrote. "At
times, the temptation to wield this power
becomes irresistible. The justices, at such
times, will attempt to steer the law in order
to achieve certain ends and advance certain
values. In following this path, the justices
are likely to forget both that they are judges
and that their court is a court."
Ms. Kagan added that "social justice" must
be accompanied by legal rationale. "Judicial
opinions may well appeal to the ethical
sense-but this alone is not enough," she
wrote. "In order to achieve some measure of
permanence in an ever-fluctuating political
and social order, judicial decisions must be
plausibly rooted in either the Constitution or
another accepted source of law."
The thesis, which was sent to the Senate on
Tuesday, was an analysis of the so-called
exclusionary rule that bars prosecutors from
using evidence gained illegally. Ms. Kagan
was critical of a liberal ruling not for its
judicial activism or its efforts to achieve a
form of social justice, but because it was not
more rigorously grounded in a legal
foundation that would survive future attacks.
The analysis reflected the views of a nearly
23-year-old Oxford student who had not yet
gone to law school, and her thinking may
have evolved. Indeed, when she was made
solicitor general last year, she rejected the
role of courts in leading the way toward
social justice. "It is a great deal better for the
elected branches to take the lead in creating
a more just society than for the courts to do
so," she wrote.
But the thesis does offer a window into the
roots of Ms. Kagan's legal and political
philosophy that is likely to attract scrutiny
during her confirmation hearings.
Conservatives cite the notion that courts
should consider social ends as an example of
improper judicial activism. Since Ms. Kagan
has never been a judge, she has fewer
writings to define her theories.
The thesis was among more than 6,000
pages of documents sent to the Senate on
Tuesday, including over 200 pages of
answers to a questionnaire and articles,
speeches and other papers requested by
senators. Many of the papers were released
during her confirmation as solicitor general,
but both parties will spend coming days
mining them for clues to her thinking.
Among issues that have arisen is her view of
executive power. In summarizing a 2005
panel discussion, Ms. Kagan described as "a
little bit scary" the view that "there aren't
really any legal constraints" on the
president's authority to fight terrorism.
The papers sent to the Senate indicated that
the White House began contacting
candidates for the Supreme Court at least a
month before Justice John Paul Stevens
announced he was retiring. Ms. Kagan wrote
that she was first contacted by the White
House counsel, Robert Bauer, on March 5.
Justice Stevens did not disclose his plans
until April 9.
In her answers to the questionnaire, Ms.
Kagan promised that if confirmed she would
not participate in any case for which she
signed the government's briefs while
solicitor general. She disclosed that her net
worth jumped more than $750,000 over the
past year to $1.76 million, apparently the
result of the sale of a home she bought in
2004.
Former Solicitors General Endorse
Elena Kagan for Solicitor General
Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee
January 27, 2009
Walter Dellinger & Theodore Olson, on behalf of Charles Fried, Kenneth W. Starr, Drew S.
Days III, Seth P. Waxman, Paul Clement & Gregory G. Garre
Dear Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter:
We who have had the honor of serving as
Solicitor General over the past quarter
century, from 1985 to 2009, in the
administrations of Presidents Ronald
Reagan, George H.W. Bush, William
Clinton, and George W. Bush, write to
endorse the nomination of Dean Elena
Kagan to be the next Solicitor General of the
United States. We are confident that Dean
Kagan will bring distinction to the office,
continue its highest traditions and be a
forceful advocate for the United States
before the Supreme Court.
Elena Kagan would bring to the position of
Solicitor General a breadth of experience
and a history of great accomplishment in the
law. She has served as a law clerk to
Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall,
she has been in private practice at one of
America's leading law firms, she has served
in the office of the Counsel to the President,
she has been a policy advisor to the
President, she has been a legal scholar of the
first rank at two of the nation's leading law
schools, Harvard and Chicago, and her
research and writing in the fields of
constitutional and administrative law will be
highly relevant to the substantive work of
the office. Most significantly, Kagan has
been regarded as one of the most successful
law school deans in modem times. All these
experiences and accomplishments will serve
her well in fulfilling the complex
responsibilities required of the Solicitor
General.
The well-deserved stature that Kagan has
achieved in the legal profession will enhance
her tenure as Solicitor General, ensuring
that, within the executive branch, her voice
and the conclusions reached by the office of
the Solicitor General will be accorded the
highest respect. The extraordinary skill she
has demonstrated in bringing to Harvard an
impressive array of new scholars, her ability
to manage and lead a complex institution,
and the high regard in which she is held by
persons of a wide variety of political and
social views, suggest that she will excel at
the important job of melding the views of
various agencies and departments into
coherent positions that advance the best
interests of the national government.
She will be a strong voice for the United
States before the Supreme Court. Her
brilliant intellect will be respected by the
Justices, and her directness, candor and
frank analysis will make her an especially
effective advocate.
We are confident that Elena Kagan, if
confirmed, will continue the best traditions
and bring added distinction to the office of
the Solicitor General.
"Just Answer the Question"
The New York Times
May 11, 2010
Linda Greenhouse
Among its other virtues, the nomination of
Solicitor General Elena Kagan to the
Supreme Court is an opportunity to rescue
the confirmation process from the "vapid
and hollow charade" that it has become.
The words in quotation marks are those of
Ms. Kagan herself, from an article she wrote
for the law review of the University of
Chicago when she was an assistant law
professor there in 1995. The article was a
clarion call for substantive questions from
senators and similarly substantive answers
from Supreme Court nominees. The court
and its justices, Professor Kagan asserted,
are simply too important for anything less to
be acceptable.
The implications of her analysis are little
short of revolutionary. Although the 15-
year-old article focuses on the confirmation
hearings for Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen G. Breyer-whose
confirmation strategy Professor Kagan
described as "alternating platitudinous
statement and judicious silence" in response
to questions by senators who then failed to
push the nominees further-it is hardly
outdated.
In the years since, we have heard
descriptions of justices as umpires who
simply call balls and strikes (John G.
Roberts Jr.) or who decide cases by
matching the facts to the law, "with the law
always commanding the result in every
case" (Sonia Sotomayor). Professor Kagan,
by contrast, did not flinch from the truth of
the matter.
The position of a justice is "both a seat of
power and a public trust," she wrote, adding
that justices' votes often "have little to do
with technical legal ability and much to do
with conceptions of value." A confirmation
hearing should uncover a nominee's "vision
of the court" in specifics, not generalities.
"Privacy rights, free speech, race and gender
discrimination"-everything should be
placed on the table for analysis, Professor
Kagan wrote.
I hope very much that the nominee means
now what she wrote then. But that won't
matter if, as I fear, her White House
handlers muzzle her on the theory that there
is nothing to be gained by departing from
the minimalist approach to hearings that has
been working.
That would be an unfortunate calculation.
Despite taking great care to reveal almost
nothing, Sonia Sotomayor received 31 no
votes. Only nine of the 40 Republican
senators voted for her. So what was gained
by the minimalist strategy? I would argue
that her hearing was a net loss-not only for
the public, which missed a chance to learn
something about how judges actually think
and behave, but for progressives in
particular. The Sotomayor proceeding
allowed conservatives to claim a sort of
moral victory: see, they crowed, the only
kind of nominee who can make the grade is
one who intones our anti-activist mantra.
No one has asked me, but I have a question
to which I would love to get Solicitor
General Kagan's answer. Last October, in
her second appearance before the Supreme
Court, she defended the federal
government's position on the validity of a
Congressionally authorized land swap in the
Mojave Desert that left a Latin cross
standing on land that had once been federal
property, but was now privately owned. The
question in the case, Salazar v. Buono, was
whether this extremely odd real estate deal
was a proper response to a decision that a
private citizen had won in a lower court,
which ruled that it was unconstitutional for
the cross to be displayed on federal land.
Ms. Kagan argued that the plaintiff, Frank
Buono, no longer had standing to pursue his
challenge because he had testified earlier
that as a Catholic, he had no general
objection to crosses, just to crosses on
government property. But the cross was now
on private land; ergo, ran the government's
argument, no standing.
To be fair, Ms. Kagan did not invent this
sophistic argument; she inherited it from the
Bush administration. But she pursued it with
enthusiasm. I thought it was preposterous,
and so did the court, to claim that the man
who had successfully brought the case had
lost his right to dispute Congress's end run
around his lower court victory.
Only Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence
Thomas agreed with Ms. Kagan's argument,
and Justice Anthony Kennedy's plurality
opinion dispatched it in a few sentences. I
would like to know what Solicitor General
Kagan really thought of that argument. The
answer matters because, although that case
is over and done with, the question of
whether to foreclose access to court for
citizens seeking to vindicate their rights is
very much alive and is almost certain to be a
continuing pressure point within the Roberts
court.
That's only one question, and there are
many others. We have waited a long time
for a nominee willing to give answers.
"Kagan Reminds Senators,
Legislation Is Your Job"
The New York Times
July 2, 2010
Adam Liptak
Supreme Court confirmation hearings are
usually designed to probe a nominee's
conception of the role of the justices. But
this week's questioning of Elena Kagan
turned into a tutorial on Congressional
responsibility.
Over and over, Ms. Kagan reminded the
senators questioning her of their own duty to
pass cogent, sensible-and constitutional-
laws. The Supreme Court, she said, was not
created to strike down foolish measures.
On Tuesday, for instance, Senator Tom
Coburn, Republican of Oklahoma, asked
what should happen if Congress enacted a
law requiring Americans "to eat three
vegetables and three fruits every day."
"It sounds like a dumb law," Ms. Kagan
said. But she would not commit to striking it
down. "I think that courts would be wrong
to strike down laws that they think are
senseless, just because they're senseless,"
she said.
Ms. Kagan repeatedly said she would show
"great deference to Congress." Perhaps
surprisingly, that was not what many
senators seemed to want to hear. They
appeared to want the Supreme Court to save
them from themselves.
Richard H. Pildes, a law professor at New
York University, said Ms. Kagan's attitude
toward Congress amounted to tough love.
"Elena is a hard-minded person," he said.
"She's lucid and clear and demanding of
herself and demanding of others."
"The deference to Congress that she's
talking about," Professor Pildes added,
"brings with it a real sense of the
responsibilities of Congress as well."
Asked on Wednesday by Senator Orrin G.
Hatch, Republican of Utah, why, in her role
as solicitor general, she had made an
aggressive argument in defending a federal
statute outlawing the sale of dogfighting
videos, Ms. Kagan said poor legislative
craftsmanship had left her little choice.
"I hesitate to criticize Congress's work," she
said, "but it was a statute that was not
drafted with the kind of precision that made
it easy to defend from a First Amendment
challenge."
Ms. Kagan aligned herself with Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who held his
nose in the early years of the last century
while voting to uphold statutes he thought
were foolish.
Justice Holmes, Ms. Kagan said, "hated a lot
of the legislation that was being enacted
during those years, but insisted that if the
people wanted it, it was their right to go
hang themselves."
In his memorable dissent in Lochner v. New
York, a 1905 decision that struck down a
New York work-hours law, Justice Holmes
wrote that the Supreme Court should work
hard to stay out of the way where economic
legislation is concerned.
"A constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory," he wrote. "It is
made for people of fundamentally differing
views, and the accident of our finding
certain opinions natural and familiar, or
novel, and even shocking, ought not to
conclude our judgment upon the question
whether statutes embodying them conflict
with the Constitution of the United States."
That is essentially the answer Ms. Kagan
gave, in a kind of confirmation jujitsu, to
questions from senators of both parties eager
to see their views made into law by the
courts rather than Congress.
Senator Amy Klobuchar, Democrat of
Minnesota, asked about opportunities for
female lawyers. Ms. Kagan agreed that
society had far to go. "But this isn't the
court's role," she said. "This really is
Congress's role."
What about the disparity between sentences
imposed for trafficking in crack and powder
cocaine, one that tends to produce racially
skewed punishment? asked Senator Richard
J. Durbin, Democrat of Illinois.
"It is a policy issue, quintessentially," Ms.
Kagan responded. "There's nothing that the
Supreme Court or that any court can do
about it. It's really one that Congress has to
decide."
Like judges, members of Congress also
swear to uphold the Constitution, Ms. Kagan
said, and they should not look to the courts
to save them from their folly.
"Substance, At Last!"
The New Republic
July 1, 2010
Jeffrey Rosen
Far from turning into a "vapid and hollow
charade," to use Elena Kagan's now-famous
condemnation of other Supreme Court
confirmation hearings, her own have been
impressively substantive. But the most
surprising development in the Kagan
hearings this week has been the performance
of the Senators: Both Democrats and
Republicans have articulated clear visions of
the law-Democrats say judges should
uphold progressive legislation like campaign
finance and health care; Republicans say
they should strike those regulations down-
and have pressed Kagan in sophisticated
ways.
My nominee for the best question comes
from Senator Al Franken, who, although not
a lawyer, has emerged as the leading
progressive constitutionalist in the Senate. In
his championing of net neutrality and
opposition to the Comcast/NBC merger,
Franken recognizes that private
corporations, like Comcast, now have more
power over who can speak than any
government, and that the most important
threats to free speech in the twenty-first
century will come not from government but
from the concentration of corporate power.
"When the same company owns the
programming and runs the pipes that bring
us the programming, I think we have a
problem," Franken said to Kagan.
Quoting an opinion by Justice Hugo Black,
which held that First Amendment values
support vigorous antitrust enforcement
because "freedom to publish is guaranteed
by the Constitution, but freedom to combine
to keep others from publishing is not,"
Franken worried that Comcast, "the nation's
largest cable operator and also the largest
home Internet service provider" could "if it
owned both the pipes and the
programming," have "the ultimate ability to
keep others from publishing," favoring its
own programming or charging more for it.
"To make matters worse," Franken said, "if
Comcast and NBC merge, I worry that
AT&T and Verizon are going to decide that
they have to buy ABC or CBS to compete,"
resulting in "less independent programming,
fewer voices, and a smaller marketplace of
ideas. That's a First Amendment problem.
It's also an antitrust problem." That led to
Franken's question: "Given all of this, do
you believe that the First Amendment could
inform how the government looks at media
antitrust cases?" Kagan, while unable to
comment on the pending Comcast merger,
acknowledged Franken's point: "I guess you
could be thinking about that as a kind of
policy matter as to whether the authorities
that are responsible for approving mergers
and such ought to take into account so-
called ... First-Amendment values." While
the cable shows were focused on his doodles
of Senator Sessions, Franken was making a
serious point. And it reinforced the theme he
struck throughout the hearings: that the pro-
corporate decisions of the Roberts Court are
harming American citizens in tangible ways.
First runner-up for questions about free
speech: Senator Amy Klobuchar, who asked
Kagan about a law review article in which
she had criticized the rigorous standard for
libel set out in New York Times v. Sullivan,
suggesting that it allowed private figures to
be defamed without an effective remedy.
Had the confirmation process or comments
from social media and bloggers changed her
views? After emphasizing that "I think
people should be able to write anything they
want about me, and I don't think that I
should be able to sue them for libel," Kagan
said: "Even as we understand the absolute
necessity for a kind of New York Times
versus Sullivan sort of rule and for
protection of speakers from libel suits,
defamation suits, even as we understand
that, we should also appreciate that people
who did nothing to ask for trouble, who
didn't put themselves into the public sphere
can be greatly harmed when something goes
around the Internet and everybody believes
something false about a person. That's a real
harm. And the legal system should not
pretend that it's not."
Michael McConnell Endorses Kagan
Letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee
June 25, 2010
Michael McConnell
Dear Senators:
I address my comments especially to those
who adhere to a generally conservative
understanding of the role of the Supreme
Court in interpreting the Constitution and
the laws of the United States. Obviously,
any nominee of this Administration will
reflect the progressive political outlook of
the President; one of the prerogatives of the
President under our Constitution is
nominating Justices who share his views.
Much in Elena Kagan's record demonstrates
that outlook. But this must not be
exaggerated. On a significant number of
important and controversial matters, Elena
Kagan has taken positions associated with
the conservative side of the legal academy.
This demonstrates an openness to a diversity
of ideas, as well as a lack of partisanship,
that bodes well for service on the Court. No
one can foresee the future, but I would not
be surprised to find that Elena Kagan, as a
Justice, serves more as a bridge between the
factions on the Court than as a reliably
progressive ideological vote. In short, I think
she will be more conservative than liberals
hope, and less liberal than conservatives
fear.
It is all too easy to speak of nominees in airy
generalities, so let me be specific. I will
comment on her work on freedom of speech,
freedom of religion, and executive power, as
well as her role as Dean of the Harvard Law
School in attracting a more ideologically
diverse faculty. I will also offer a comment
on what I regard as the only serious blemish
on her record: her participation in Harvard's
refusal to allow students who wished to
interview for careers in the military the
ability to use the ordinary facilities of career
services.
Freedom of Speech
Freedom of speech was one of Professor
Kagan's two principal fields of scholarly
work. Her writings on this subject have been
thoughtful, insightful, and of high academic
quality, and on many if not most points
congruent with conservative civil libertarian
thinking on these issues. I would call
particular attention to her article entitled The
Changing Faces of First Amendment
Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v.
Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based
Underinclusion, The R.A. V case was
difficult and controversial, involving a hate
speech prosecution based on an ugly cross-
burning incident in St. Paul, Minnesota.
There were three opinions. One, by Justice
Antonin Scalia, applied the strong
protections for freedom of speech that have
been characteristic of conservative free
speech jurisprudence over the past
generation. It held that the local ordinance
under which the defendant had been
prosecuted was viewpoint discriminatory
and hence unconstitutional. Another
opinion, by Justice John Paul Stevens,
described Justice Scalia's position as
"absolutist" and maintained that even
"selective, subject-matter regulation on
proscribable speech is constitutional." In her
article on the case, Professor Kagan wrote
that "Justice Scalia seems to me to have the
upper hand," and that Justice Stevens's
position "cannot be right as a general
matter."
It bears mention that the principle of
viewpoint neutrality has been central to free
speech victories on the part of dissidents
from leftwing orthodoxy on campus,
including most conspicuously Rosenberger
v. University of Virginia. It thus appears that
conservative defenders of freedom of speech
will have an additional ally on the Court.
Notably, Professor Kagan wrote her R.A. V.
article at a time when hate speech codes
were supported by many left-leaning
members of the legal academy. Thus, her
article demonstrates not only that her
constitutional principles on this matter lean
more toward the conservative position, but
that she has the courage and independence
to take sides at odds with the tide of opinion
among her ostensible political allies.
Some conservative free speech supporters
have criticized Solicitor General Kagan's
defense of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act (BCRA) in the Citizens United case, and
her decision to argue the case personally.
Speaking as a former lawyer in the Solicitor
General's office, I regard this criticism as
specious: it is the job of the Solicitor
General to defend the constitutionality of
statutes. Every Solicitor General defends
statutes with which he or she does not agree.
(Certainly that was true of the Solicitors
General under whom I served, Rex E. Lee
and Charles Fried.) More importantly, these
critics fail to give proper weight to the
nature of the arguments General Kagan
made, and did not make, in the case.
Although she defended BCRA on the basis
of anti-corruption and stockholder-
protection rationales, she conspicuously
failed to put forward the most common, but
troubling rationale for restricting corporate
political speech: that to allow great
aggregations of wealth to participate in
campaign-related speech would distort the
marketplace of ideas.
General Kagan's decision not to defend the
law on this basis was surprising, because the
Supreme Court had previously embraced
that rationale in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce. According to
Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion in
Austin, the ability of corporations to use
"resources amassed in the economic
marketplace" would give them "an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace." The
government thus has a "compelling interest"
in preventing "the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregation of wealth"
on the democratic process. Because one of
the questions posed in Citizens United was
whether Austin should be overruled, and
General Kagan was defending Austin, it
would have been standard practice to present
and defend all the rationales on which
Austin rested.
We can be nearly certain that the reason
General Kagan did not present the "anti-
distortion" rationale is that she does not
agree with it. In The Changing Faces of
First Amendment Neutrality, she wrote that
giving the government the power "to decide
what ideas are overrepresented or
underrepresented in the market" and would
be "dangerous." It would be dangerous
because the playing field of speech and
political advocacy is inherently filled with
inequality, and if the government may
choose which inequalities to "correct" by
suppressing some speakers and not others, it
would have a powerful instrument for
suppression of speech, going far beyond the
context of corporations.
General Kagan's decision to omit the anti-
distortion argument is all the more
remarkable because this rationale has been
embraced by the President who nominated
her, as well as the Justice whom she has
been nominated to replace. In his speech
announcing the nomination, President
Obama stated that he was nominating a
Justice "who, like Justice Stevens, knows
that in a democracy, powerful interests must
not be allowed to drown out the voices of
ordinary citizens." That may be true of
Justice Stevens, who embraced the anti-
distortion argument in his dissent in Citizens
United. But General Kagan declined to
make any such argument. Whether Senators
agree with Elena Kagan on this point or not,
the fact that she was willing to adhere to her
civil libertarian principles under these
circumstances demonstrates remarkable
independence.
Executive Power
On her return to academia after serving in
the Clinton Administration, Professor Kagan
turned primary attention to the question of
executive power under administrative and
constitutional law. Significantly, she
defended the legitimacy and utility of direct
presidential control over the regulatory
agencies of the federal government. As she
explains in an article entitled Presidential
Administration, this degree of presidential
control originated in modern times under
President Reagan, but was extended under
President Clinton. Although she
distinguishes her position from strict notions
of a constitutional unitary executive, in
effect she reaches the same end through
statutory analysis.
Professor Kagan's writings on executive
power are neither path-breaking nor
particularly controversial, but their political
context is noteworthy. She was writing
during the early days of the presidency of
President George W. Bush. It is one thing to
defend executive power when the
administration is political congenial, and
quite another to do so when the presidency
is held by a reviled member of the other
political party. That Professor Kagan was
willing to write in defense of broad
presidential authority at the time she did,
and in the teeth of an anti-executive turn by
many of her political friends, demonstrates
that her constitutional positions are driven
by principle rather than political
convenience. Whatever one's views of the
executive, that kind of integrity is a judicial
virtue.
Conclusion
One of the most enduring questions about
law and judging is whether it is anything
more than politics. In her service in the
executive branch and her time as Dean,
Elena Kagan has skillfully navigated
political waters. But she has also
demonstrated another quality. Publicly and
privately, in her scholarly work and in her
arguments on behalf of the United States,
Elena Kagan has demonstrated a fidelity to
legal principle even when it means crossing
her political and ideological allies. This is an
admirable and essential quality in a judge.
Barring unexpected developments during the
confirmation hearings, I urge you to confirm
Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court.
"The Case Against Confirmation"
The National Review
July 12, 2010
Senator Orrin G. Hatch
Elena Kagan's record shows her to be an
inappropriate choice for the Supreme Court.
After studying Elena Kagan's record,
actively participating in her hearing, and
listening to the views of folks in Utah and
across the country, I do not believe that she
meets the standards we should require of
federal judges-especially Supreme Court
justices.
The first important standard is experience.
Ms. Kagan has never before served as a
judge-and, in addition, has little legal
experience of any kind. Over the Supreme
Court's long history, justices who were
nominated without past judicial experience
have had an average of 21 years of legal
practice. Ms. Kagan has two. Her experience
is instead academic and political.
Ms. Kagan's lack of experience puts even
greater emphasis on the second standard: an
appropriate judicial philosophy. America's
founders gave us some principles that
establish this standard. James Wilson, who
signed the Declaration of Independence and
was one of Pres. George Washington's
original Supreme Court appointees, said that
in America, "the people are masters of the
government." To be masters of the
government, the people must control the
Constitution that created government.
President Washington said in his farewell
address that the very "basis of our political
systems is the right of the people to make
and alter their constitutions of government."
Controlling the Constitution means not only
selecting its words but determining the
meaning of those words. Thomas Jefferson
warned that our written Constitution can
help secure liberty only if it is not made a
"blank paper by construction."
The law that federal judges interpret and
apply to decide cases is written law-the
Constitution and statutes. The Constitution
must not only say what the people said when
they made it, but it must mean what the
people meant. Judges who take control of
the Constitution's meaning take away the
people's control over their Constitution and
destroy this essential ingredient for liberty.
Will the Constitution control Elena Kagan,
or will she try to control the Constitution?
Does she believe that judges may change the
meaning of the Constitution, and of the law
generally? Is there any evidence that her
personal or political views drive her legal
views?
Ms. Kagan told the Judiciary Committee
that "I think you can look to my whole life
for indications of what kind of a judge or
justice I would be." That review provides
several important categories of evidence.
First, she has written and spoken generally
about the role judges play in our system of
government. In her Oxford University
master's thesis, for example, Ms. Kagan
wrote that "new times and circumstances
demand a different interpretation of the
Constitution" and that judges may "mold
and steer the law in order to promote certain
ethical values and achieve certain social
ends." Several years later, as a law
professor, she wrote that "the judge's own
experience and values become the most
important element in the decision" of most
Supreme Court cases. "If that is too results
oriented," she wrote, "so be it."
Ms. Kagan served as a law clerk to Supreme
Court justice Thurgood Marshall. In a
tribute she wrote after his death, she
described as a "thing of glory" his belief that
the role of the courts and the purpose of
constitutional interpretation is to "safeguard
the interests of people who had no other
champion." In 2006, while dean of Harvard
Law School, Ms. Kagan introduced Israeli
Supreme Court justice Aharon Barak as "the
judge or justice in my lifetime whom I think
best represents and has best advanced . . .
the rule of law." Justice Barak is widely
credited as perhaps the most activist jurist in
the world; for him, as Judge Richard Posner
has described it, "the judiciary is a law unto
itself."
The second category of evidence comes
from the actions she took and the decisions
she made while serving in the Clinton
administration and as dean of Harvard Law
School. Ms. Kagan played a central role in
developing and advancing the Clinton
administration's extreme position on
abortion, including the barbaric practice of
partial-birth abortion. In a 1996 legislative-
strategy memo, she labeled a "disaster" a
proposed statement by a key medical group
that there exist "no circumstances" in which
partial-birth abortion is the only option. She
drafted, and persuaded the group to adopt,
language with a much more positive
political spin. At her hearing, she offered the
Judiciary Committee the implausible claim
that she was merely trying to ensure that the
medical group accurately expressed its own
medical opinion.
In a 1997 legislative-strategy memo after
President Clinton vetoed the Partial Birth
Abortion Ban Act, Ms. Kagan urged him to
support substitutes offered by Democratic
senators. This tactic was intended to siphon
votes away from a veto override, and,
because the substitutes would not pass, leave
partial-birth abortion unlimited. She made
this political recommendation, however,
even though the Justice Department's Office
of Legal Counsel concluded that the
substitutes were unconstitutional under Roe
v. Wade. It appears that her personal or
political views trumped her legal views.
At Harvard, Ms. Kagan defied the federal
Solomon Amendment, which required that,
at schools that receive federal funding,
military recruiters must be given the same
access to students that other employers have.
In 2002, the Defense Department informed
Harvard that its practice of letting military
recruiters contact students through the
Harvard Law School Veterans
Association-which had no office, no
budget, and no staff-rather than the
school's own Office of Career Services, did
not comply with the law.
Ms. Kagan condemned the so-called "don't
ask, don't tell" law, calling it a "moral
injustice of the first order," and joined a
legal brief in a case challenging the
constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment. Hours after the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit enjoined the
law, she reinstated the "separate but equal"
policy and shut military recruiters out of the
CSO. Harvard, however, is in the First
Circuit, not the Third, which means that the
Solomon Amendment was still in force. Ms.
Kagan continued blocking equal access by
military recruiters even after the Third
Circuit stayed its own decision. Once again,
her personal views drove her legal views.
Ms. Kagan's hearing did nothing to temper
the picture of judicial activism painted by
her record. Despite the excessive media and
political attention one can receive, a
confirmation hearing is only a small part of
the picture for any nominee, and Supreme
Court hearings have become less and less
meaningful, with nominees prepared and
prepped to provide answers that are more
form than substance. Ms. Kagan, for
example, referred to any previous Supreme
Court decision as "settled law," whether it
was two days or two centuries old. Her
pledge to give such "binding precedent...
all the respect of binding precedent" told us
nothing more. In effect, she said that a
decision is a decision and a precedent is a
precedent-not much to go on.
Ms. Kagan chose not to answer many
questions by various senators about a range
of issues. I spent 30 minutes asking her
about freedom of speech, campaign-finance
reform, and the Citizens United v. FEC case,
which she argued before the Supreme Court.
I asked for her own views, but she instead
told me what Congress said, what she
argued before the Court, and what the Court
held. I already knew those things because I
had read the statute, the transcript, and the
opinion. She would not even admit that she
had in fact written the 1996 memo about
partial-birth abortion that not only bore her
name but included her handwritten notes.
After three attempts, all she would say is
that it was in her handwriting; I suppose that
left open the possibility that it had been
forged.
A nominee, of course, may choose to use
such code words and evasions. For Ms.
Kagan, however, this choice stood in stark
contrast to her previous strong critique of
Supreme Court confirmation hearings. After
serving on the Judiciary Committee staff
during Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's
hearing, Ms. Kagan wrote in a 1995 law-
journal article that Supreme Court
confirmation hearings had become a "vapid
and hollow charade" and taken on "an air of
vacuity and farce." The solution, she said,
was for a nominee to discuss "the votes she
would cast, the perspective she would add,
and the direction in which she would move
the institution." Ms. Kagan refused to
discuss any of these at her own hearing,
prompting the Associated Press to ask the
question on many Judiciary Committee
members' minds: "What happened to the
Kagan standard?"
Liberty requires limits on government; it
always has, and it always will. That includes
limits on judges. Measured against that
standard, Elena Kagan's record shows that
her primarily academic and political
experience and her activist judicial
philosophy make her inappropriate for
serving on the Supreme Court. Her hearing
offered nothing to neutralize the clear
evidence of what kind of justice she will be.
"Elena Kagan Approved by Senate Judiciary
Committee in 13-6 Vote"
Los Angeles Times
July 21, 2010
David G. Savage
Democratic and Republican senators alike
lamented the increasingly sharp partisan
divide over the Constitution and the courts
Tuesday, and then divided mostly along
party lines to approve Elena Kagan,
President Obama's nominee for the Supreme
Court.
The lone maverick was Sen. Lindsey
Graham (R-S.C.), who voted to confirm
Kagan because, he said, she is smart, well-
qualified and of good character.
"But yes, she's liberal," he said, and paused.
"Sort of expected that, actually."
Kagan won a 13-6 vote from the Senate
Judiciary Committee, the next to last stop on
her way to a lifetime seat on the Supreme
Court. The Senate is expected to give her
final approval in early August.
If Kagan is confirmed, the nine-member
high court will have four Democratic
appointees for the first time since 1971. And
for the first time ever, three of the justices
will be women, and none will be a
Protestant.
But Graham drew the studied attention of
the committee members with his warning
that partisan politics is playing too large a
role when considering judges.
"Something's changing when it comes to the
'advice and consent' clause," he said,
referring to the part of the Constitution that
gives the Senate the power to approve the
president's court nominees. "Things are
changing here, and they're unnerving to
me."
In the past, a president's well-qualified
nominees usually won easy confirmation
from the Senate. Justice John Paul Stevens,
whom Kagan would replace, won
unanimous approval from the Senate in
1975, even though Democrats had a large
majority and he was a Republican nominee.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M.
Kennedy also won unanimous votes in the
late 1980s. In the last decade, however, the
Senate has split along party lines over
Supreme Court candidates. Kagan is
expected to win only a handful of
Republican votes.
The president shares part of the blame for
this pattern, Graham said. As an Illinois
senator planning to run for president, Obama
praised John G. Roberts Jr., President
George W. Bush's nominee to be chief
justice, as exceptionally well-qualified. He
nonetheless voted against his nomination.
Obama also cast a "no" vote against Samuel
A. Alito Jr., who was confirmed in 2006
with support from only four Democrats.
"Sen. Obama was part of the problem, not
the solution," Graham said.
For Sen. Arlen Specter (D-Pa.), it was
probably his last Supreme Court hearing
after 30 years in the Senate. He too fretted
over the partisan division. "I am sorry, but
not surprised, to see the partisan split on this
nomination, because that reflects the
ideological battleground that is going on the
Supreme Court today," he said.
The court, like Congress, regularly divides
along conservative-liberal lines. That split
may appear even more political in the year
ahead, with five Republican appointees who
cast conservative votes and four Democratic
appointees who will likely vote as a liberal
bloc.
"This reflects a hardening of the partisan
divide on constitutional issues," said
Princeton University professor Christopher
Eisgruber. "To take one example, tell me
how a judge votes on abortion, and I can
probably tell you how he votes on gay
rights, affirmative action, campaign finance,
gun control and so on. There is a clear,
coherent ideological view across the issues.
It wasn't always like that."
In the 1970s and early 1980s, several
justices, including Potter Stewart, Byron
White, Lewis Powell and John Paul Stevens,
could not be easily labeled as liberal or
conservative. Only Kennedy plays a similar
role today, voting with the conservatives on
some issues and the liberals on others.
"Kagan Is Sworn In as the Fourth Woman,
and 112th Justice, on the Supreme Court"
The New York Times
August 8, 2010
Peter Baker
Elena Kagan was sworn in on Saturday as
the 112th person, and fourth woman, to
serve on the Supreme Court, continuing a
generational and demographic
transformation of the nation's highest bench.
In keeping with tradition, Ms. Kagan first
took the constitutional oath given to a wide
array of officials and then the judicial oath
administered to those wearing the robe.
Joined by family and friends in the Supreme
Court building, she swore to "administer
justice without respect to persons, and do
equal right to the poor and to the rich."
The low-key formal ceremony came two
days after she was confirmed by the Senate
and a day after President Obama marked her
ascension with a jubilant televised
celebration in the East Room of the White
House. She was Mr. Obama's second
successful nominee to the court, and her
approval by the Senate was taken as a jolt of
validation for a White House battered by
political and economic troubles.
Succeeding Justice John Paul Stevens, the
court's retiring liberal leader, Justice Kagan,
50, presumably will not drastically change
the philosophical balance on the divided
court. But if she were to serve until she was
90, as Justice Stevens has, she would have
four decades to shape the nation's legal
architecture, long after the man who
appointed her left the White House. Even a
shorter tenure would give her time to leave
her mark.
Arguably, Justice Kagan made a mark from
the moment she took the oaths on Saturday.
She is the third woman on the current court,
joining Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Sonia Sotomayor. She is also the fifth justice
born after World War II, making that group
a majority, and she brings down the average
age on the court to 64, from nearly 69. And
she is the first person since William H.
Rehnquist, 38 years ago, to join the court
without experience as a judge.
If her installation added diversity in some
ways, though, it reinforced the court's lack
of it in other areas. Her addition means the
court now includes neither Protestants nor
anyone without an Ivy League background.
Justice Kagan joins two other Jewish
justices and six Catholics. She is the sixth
justice to have studied at Harvard Law
School (although Justice Ginsburg later
transferred to and graduated from Columbia
Law School); the other three graduated from
Yale Law School. And she is the fourth
justice to have grown up in New York City.
Mr. Obama did not attend Saturday's
ceremony, but at Friday's event he said a
third woman on the court would make it "a
little more inclusive, a little more
representative." He added, "It is yet another
example of how our union has become
more, not less, perfect over time-more
open, more fair, more free."
Afterward, Justice Kagan made no mention
of that but vowed to uphold the rule of law,
saying she would "work my hardest and try
my best to fulfill these commitments and
serve this country I love as well as I am
able."
Justice Kagan seemed to have had her sights
trained on the Supreme Court for years. She
served as a lawyer and domestic policy aide
in the Clinton White House, was dean of
Harvard Law School and, last year, was
appointed by Mr. Obama as solicitor
general, the government's lawyer before the
Supreme Court.
She was confirmed Thursday on a 63-to-37
Senate vote, with most Republicans
opposing her, citing her lack of judicial
experience and liberal views on issues like
abortion, guns and gay rights.
Republicans criticized her for barring
military recruiters from using a Harvard
facility because of the rule banning gays and
lesbians from serving openly. They also said
she "would ally herself not with the
constitutional liberties of all Americans, but
with the big government agenda of the
president who nominated her," as Senator
Jeff Sessions of Alabama, the ranking
Republican on the Judiciary Committee, put
it.
Saturday's ceremony consisted of two parts.
First, in the justices' conference room with
just a handful of Ms. Kagan's relatives
present, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
administered the constitutional oath for
federal employees swearing to "support and
defend the Constitution." Then they moved
into the larger West Conference Room,
where the chief justice administered the
judicial oath.
"Kagan Steps into Kennedy's Court: Immigration,
Health Care and Gay Rights Await Newest Justice"
Los Angeles Times
August 8, 2010
David G. Savage
This summer, as Elena Kagan quietly moved
toward confirmation to the Supreme Court,
three major legal disputes took shape that
could define her early years.
The justices soon will be called upon to
decide whether Arizona and other states can
enforce the immigration laws, whether
same-sex couples have a right to marry and
whether Americans can be required to buy
health insurance. Kagan's record strongly
suggests she will vote in favor of federal
regulation of immigration and health
insurance and vote to oppose denial of
marriage rights to gays and lesbians.
What is less clear is whether she will be
voting with a center-left majority that
includes Justice Anthony Kennedy, or as
liberal dissenter on a court whose five
Republican appointees outvote the four
Democratic appointees.
Kagan, at age 50, is the fourth new justice in
five years. And for the first time, the high
court has three women. But the ideological
divide is unlikely to change much.
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and
Samuel Alito form a solid conservative bloc.
The liberal bloc includes Justices Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Sonia
Sotomayor, with Kagan now set to replace
Justice John Paul Stevens.
In the major cases that divide the court,
however, the outcome almost always
depends on Kennedy, 74.
At this time last year, Kagan was preparing
to defend the 63-year-old law that barred
businesses from spending corporate money
to elect or defeat candidates for office. It
was her first argument before the court, and
she expected to lose. Kagan had been a
student of the court's work for two decades
before becoming U.S. solicitor general, and
she knew Kennedy believed "corporate
political speech" was protected by the First
Amendment.
Her instincts proved correct. In January she
was on the losing end of the 5-4 decision in
the Citizens United case, with Kennedy
speaking for the conservatives and striking
down the election spending limits for
corporations and unions.
She no doubt hopes to have more influence
now that she has joined the court. Moreover,
Kennedy has not tipped his hand in the same
way on the upcoming disputes on
immigration, health care and same-sex
marriage.
She began her wooing of Kennedy four
years ago. As the dean of the Harvard Law
School, she invited him to be honored as a
graduate of the class of 1961.
She noted that Harvard University had
published a recent ranking of its 100 most
influential alumni, which put Kennedy in
fourth place, higher than any other members
of the Supreme Court.
"But judging is about more than power and
influence. It's also, indeed most
fundamentally, about independence and
integrity," she said. "In fact, what Justice
Kennedy has done, time and time again, and
each and every case, is to think for himself"
That is the source for "his obviously huge
influence on the current court," she said.
The immigration issue presents a dispute
between the state, which wants stricter
enforcement, and federal authority. Arizona
says it will appeal to the Supreme Court a
ruling striking down provisions of its law
requiring police to check the immigration
status of those who are arrested.
Before that case arrives, however, the high
court will decide another Arizona
immigration case that involves sanctions
against employers who hire illegal
immigrants. Kagan worked as an executive
branch lawyer in two Democratic
administrations and supports strong
executive power, so she is likely to vote for
strong federal authority over immigration.
But her support for executive authority may
tilt the court to the right on issues over the
president's power to pursue terrorism
suspects as enemy combatants. Stevens was
the leading voice for limits on presidential
power.
Meanwhile, a legal threat to President
Barack Obama's health care overhaul law
grew last week. A federal judge in Virginia
hinted that he is likely to strike down the
mandate to have health insurance as being
beyond Congress's power. "Never before
has the commerce clause ... been extended
this far," said U.S. District Judge Henry
Hudson.
In the past, Kennedy voted to strike down
federal laws on similar grounds, but he also
joined opinions that said Congress can
regulate any "economic activity."
Last week's ruling by Judge Vaughn Walker
striking down California's ban on same-sex
marriage will almost certainly send that case
to the Supreme Court. At Harvard, Kagan
spoke out strongly against discrimination
against gays. She called the U.S. military's
ban on open gays and lesbians a "profound
wrong and a moral injustice of the first
order."
Kennedy also has written strong gay-rights
opinions. One in 2003 struck down a Texas
law that treated gays as criminals, saying
that "moral disapproval" does not justify
treating gays as "unequal in the eyes of the
law." In that case, he included a caveat.
The court was not saying the state "must
give formal recognition to any relationship"
between gays, he said then. He has been
wary of the court moving ahead of public
opinion on a controversial issue.
But thanks to Walker's decision, the
question of a state's duty to give "formal
recognition" to same-sex relationships will
soon be before Kennedy and the court.
